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The Canterbury earthquake sequence of 2010 and 2011 
presented the Government with unprecedented challenges, 
not least of which was to ensure consistency and 
connectedness across each of its agencies who had a role in 
the response. 
  
This paper examines particular instances where government 
agencies connected in responding to the earthquake’s 
impact on the built environment, and identifies elements of 
the experience that should be incorporated in planning for 
future natural disasters.  
 
The key observations are: 
 
 Examples of connectedness often came about due to 
existing relationships and networks that were not born out of 
disaster planning but were fortuitous in enabling 
aspects of the Government’s response. 
 
 Individual agencies gathered large amounts of 
information in their response roles, but this could often 
only be utilised between agencies in an ad hoc way in 
the absence of existing frameworks for information 
sharing. 
 
 There are opportunities for broader government policies to be 
implemented as part of the rebuild, but these may be 
overlooked or under utilised due to competing 
priorities or lack of advance planning and role 
awareness. 
 
 A whole-of-government review of the experience in 
Canterbury is required and a strategic approach is 
necessary to implement change. As part of this, the 
importance of connectedness should be acknowledged 
and built into frameworks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Natural disasters have the capacity to force lands and lives apart, while at the same time drawing 
people and communities together. What then of the government and of the myriad of agencies 
that underpin it? How do they respond to a natural disaster and do they do so in a coordinated 
and connected manner? The Canterbury earthquake sequence of 2010 and 2011 presented the 
government with unpredictable challenges on an unprecedented scale. What have government 
agencies learnt over the last four years about the opportunities for, benefits of, and impediments 
to connectedness? This paper endeavours to draw on the experiences of those government 
agencies managing the impact on Canterbury’s built environment, and identify lessons to enable 
better connectedness for next time. 
 
This research largely focuses on examples from the residential rebuild, and on aspects of 
government interactions that were centred in Wellington, rather than service delivery aspects 
occurring on the ground in Canterbury. The word ‘connectedness’ is used here as an umbrella 
term to cover the various levels of agency interaction, which could range from conversations and 
consultation between agencies right through to collaboration in providing services. The types of 
connectedness involved will be distilled in this paper. The research was conducted through a series 
of interviews with individuals who either had operational involvement or who had broad oversight 
of their agency’s experience in connecting with others.  
 
The start of government activity in response to the disaster came on the morning of 4 September 
2010 when the National Crisis Management Centre was activated shortly after the first earthquake, 
which struck at 4:35am. The earthquake had caused widespread damage to land and buildings 
across the region, and presented an enormous task to rebuild. The following days and months 
involved a lot of work and planning from across local and central government, the private sector, 
and NGOs, but much progress was undone when on 22 February 2011, a 6.1 magnitude quake 
struck just 10 kilometres from the city. At only 5 kilometres deep and with ground accelerations 
of more than twice the acceleration due to gravity, it killed 185 people and completely changed the 
landscape of the city forever.  
 
It is difficult to articulate the impact of the earthquakes and the scale of the damage. In terms of 
buildings alone, more than 100,000 homes were damaged, many beyond repair, and more than half 
the buildings in the Central Business District have been severely damaged. It is estimated that there 
will be eight million tonnes of rubble and waste from earthquake-damaged buildings, along with 
the many thousands of tonnes of liquefaction silt that had to be removed from around the region. 
The Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team estimates that 46 per cent of Christchurch’s urban 
sealed roads will be affected – just part of the 895 kilometres that need rebuilding; the same 
distance as driving State Highway 1 from Picton to Invercargill12.  
 
In terms of economic impact, the Treasury now estimates the capital cost of the earthquakes to be 
around forty billion dollars3, the equivalent of almost twenty percent of New Zealand’s annual 
gross domestic product4. In terms of cost to insurers, the earthquakes were the third most 
                                                        
1 Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, Questions and Answers, Posted at http://cera.govt.nz/recovery-
strategy/overview/questions-and-answers#1, Retrieved 9 September 2014 
2 According to Google Directions – see https://maps.google.co.nz/maps  
3 The Treasury, (2014), ‘Rebuilding Christchurch – Our Second-Biggest City’, in Budget Policy Statement 2014, Posted 
at http://www.treasury.govt.nz/budget/2014/bps/06.htm, Retrieved 19 September 2014 
4 English, Hon. B., (2013), Budget Statement – Budget Debates, 690 NZPD 10017 
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expensive event in history5, trailing the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan, where although the 
devastation was on a different scale, the cost only constituted an estimated 3 to 4 per cent of 
Japan’s gross domestic product6. The impact of the Canterbury earthquakes on both the built 
environment and on the economy gave this the potential to be not only a natural disaster but an 
economic disaster too. 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly then, Christchurch faces an enormous task to rebuild, and the central 
government role in this has extended far beyond that immediate response through the National 
Crisis Management Centre. The government’s role has included the management of a large portion 
of the residential rebuild, the purchasing of over 7000 properties through its “red-zoning”7, the 
provision of temporary accommodation, and the establishment of a public service department to 
lead, facilitate and coordinate the recovery of the region8. Four years on from the first earthquake, 
some of the government’s tasks in the city are starting to wrap up while others are only now 
beginning to take flight. While 60,0009 properties have been repaired through the Canterbury 
Home Repair Programme as at 4 September 2014, high-rise buildings in the central city are still 
being demolished and the hammers are yet to start fully swinging on its reconstruction.  
 
There is a small window of opportunity that exists somewhere between the point at which a 
glimmer of a recovery can be seen and the point at which there is a sense that the job is nearly 
done. Before that window emerges, clarity and space to identify learnings is unavailable; beyond 
that point the people who have the experience will likely have moved on, and details of all that 
happened risk being forgotten. The Recovery Strategy Vision10 produced by the Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) promotes the concept of mō tātou, ā, mō kā uri ā muri 
ake nei – “for us and our children after us”. The sentiment is equally applicable to the responsibility 
of today’s government to prepare for tomorrow’s disaster.  
 
The Focus of this Research 
 
The “4 Rs” terminology is used in the government’s Civil Defence Emergency Management 
framework for risk management. It consists of four phase: “Reduction” and “Readiness”, focus 
on pre-event management, “Response” and “Recovery” occur directly after an event. This research 
applies principally to the fourth R Recovery phase rather than the Response phase as this is where 
much of the rebuilding is carried out. The Recovery phase is defined in the National Civil Defence 
Emergency Management Plan as “the co-ordinated efforts and processes used to bring about the 
immediate, medium-term, and long-term holistic regeneration of a community following an 
emergency”. This comes after the Response phase, which is defined as “actions taken immediately 
before, during, or directly after an emergency to save lives and property, and to help communities 
recover”.  
                                                        
5 Swiss Re, (2012), Record-Breaking Earthquake Insured Claims, Posted at 
http://www.swissre.com/media/news_releases/nr_20120328_sigma_disasters_2011.html, Retrieved 19 September 
2014 
6 Doherty, E., (2011), Economic Effects of the Canterbury Earthquakes, Parliamentary Support Research Paper, posted at 
http://www.parliament.nz/en-nz/parl-support/research-papers/00PlibCIP051/economic-effects-of-the-
canterbury-earthquakes, Retrieved 19 September 2014  
7 As at May 2014, the Authority reports that “7349 properties were zoned red on the flat land. Only 136 property 
owners chose not to accept an offer. In the Port Hills 715 properties were zoned red and their offer process remains 
underway”. See Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, (2014), Briefing for the Incoming Associate Minister for 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery, Wellington, p10 
8 Ibid, p3 
9 Earthquake Commission, (2014), Two Major EQC Repair Milestones Reached, Posted at 
http://www.eqc.govt.nz/news/two-major-eqc-repair-milestones-reached, Retrieved 4 September 2014 
10 Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, (2012), Recovery Strategy: Mahere Haumanutanga, Posted at 
http://cera.govt.nz/recovery-strategy/overview, Retrieved at 9 September 2014 
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While the “4 Rs” terminology is useful to broadly describe the focus of this research, when 
reviewing the whole-of-government role the divide between Response and Recovery can be somewhat 
artificial as an agency’s tasks tend to fall within both stages and “the establishment of recovery 
activity begins immediately after the impact of an event and works in parallel with response 
activities”11. For example, provision of temporary accommodation following a natural disaster on 
this scale can begin as an emergency arrangement but can flow through to the medium and longer 
term as has been the experience in Canterbury.  
 
For that reason, this paper does not generally divide the government’s role between the two phases. 
The term response is used throughout at a general level rather than directly referring to the formal 
Response phase. There are worthwhile observations to be made of both the aspects of 
connectedness in the extremely fast-paced Response phase, and the on-going need for 
connectedness now, four years on.  
 
New Zealand’s exposure to natural disasters 
 
New Zealand’s exposure to natural disasters is evident all around us. The features that give the 
country its striking scenery were created by the very forces that risk destroying it. New Zealand 
lies in a “geographically unstable zone, straddling two moving sections of the earth’s crust – the 
Pacific and Australian plates. Ninety-five per cent of New Zealanders live within 200 kilometres 
of the boundary where the plates meet12.  
 
In New Zealand, insured residential property13 is covered against damage from earthquakes, 
volcanoes, tsunamis, landslips, and geothermal activity. Residential land is also covered for damage 
from floods and storms. It is not by chance that these disasters have been selected; all pose a 
considerable risk in New Zealand’s unique geographical setting. Historically, parts of New Zealand 
have suffered significant damage from several earthquakes14.  Prior to the Canterbury sequence, 
there was Edgecumbe in 1987, Wairarapa in 1942, and Hawkes Bay in 1931 where 256 people 
were killed. In the last two decades we have seen volcanic eruptions from both Ruapehu and 
Tongariro, in largely unpopulated areas. It is well understood that Auckland, with a population of 
nearly 1.5million, sits across 50 separate volcanoes in a volcanic field that is still young. The most 
recent eruption being that of Rangitoto 600 years ago15. 
 
What this means for the government is that New Zealand’s exposure to hazards is real and is not 
something that can be ignored. Risk management and preparation must be a component of every 
agency’s planning and is something the government cannot afford to lose sight of. The Civil Defence 
Emergency Management Act 2002 requires all agencies to plan to enable the continuation of their 
standard functions when an emergency occurs16. This paper’s proposition is that in order to best 
understand each agency’s individual needs, connectedness should be worked into the planning 
framework.  
                                                        
11 Ministry of Civil Defence Emergency Management, (2005) Focus on Recovery – A Holistic Framework For Recovery in 
New Zealand – Ministry of Civil Defence Emergency Management, Wellington, Page 5  
12 McSaveney, E., and Nathan, S., (2012) Natural hazards – overview - Living dangerously, Posted at 
http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/natural-hazards-overview/page-1, Retrieved 9 September 2014 
13 See sections 2, 18, 19, and 20 of the Earthquake Commission Act 1993 for the types of property covered for 
natural disaster damage. 
14 Geonet, (2014), Historical Earthquakes, Posted at 
http://info.geonet.org.nz/display/quake/Historical+Earthquakes, Retrieved on 9 September 2014 
15 Geonet, (2014), Auckland Volcanic Field, Posted at 
http://info.geonet.org.nz/display/volc/Auckland+Volcanic+Field, Retrieved on 9 September 2014 
16 Section 58 of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 
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Who is involved? 
 
A large portion of government agencies had a role in the response; some of them minor, some 
facilitative and some all-encompassing. Many agencies had a natural involvement, to rescue, 
protect and ensure well-being such as the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, 
Ministry of Health, Ministry of Social Development and the emergency services. Many other 
agencies have found themselves with a considerable workload both in assisting the community 
and in managing the impact on their own institutions. Some roles are simply an extension of 
business-as-usual; others are entirely new. The diagram below illustrates a selection of roles and 
responsibilities across government agencies, and is by no means exhaustive. 
 
Figure 1: A selection of agency roles involved in Canterbury 
 
 
 
 
CERA was established following the 22 February 2011 earthquake with the purpose of facilitating, 
co-ordinating, and directing the planning, rebuilding, and recovery of affected communities. The 
legislation establishing CERA expires after five years, guaranteeing central government’s role in 
Canterbury until at least April 2016 unless amendments are made to decrease the department’s 
lifespan17. 
 
The role of providing technical guidance for both residential and commercial building repairs and 
rebuilds remains with the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE). MBIE is 
also responsible for the provision of the government’s three temporary accommodation villages 
                                                        
17 On 2 September 2014 the government announced CERA will become a Departmental Agency within the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet from the start of 2015, indicating that there is no intention to end the 
work of the Authority early, but that work will begin on a transition of responsibility to local authorities. See 
Brownlee, Hon G., (2014), Government Focuses on Long Term Quake Recovery, Media Release, Wellington 
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in Linwood, Rawhiti and Kaiapoi as well as the development of more long-term accommodation 
in the Rangers Park Housing development.18  
 
In terms of hands-on work, the Earthquake Commission (EQC) has carried out large parts of the 
residential rebuild, aiming to complete its 70,000 repairs by the end of 201419. EQC also forms 
part of the broader work between councils and central government on a range of issues, and 
continues its role from a research perspective to trial new strategies for fixing land that is vulnerable 
to liquefaction. Prior to this sequence of earthquakes, EQC had a staff of just 22 whose main role 
was to manage the natural disaster fund collected from levies, and to deal with insurance claims 
for the occasional land slip or small-scale earthquake. Since the earthquakes, EQC has experienced 
unparalleled growth and managed many unanticipated complexities born out of the scale of the 
damage and the number of significant earthquakes in the sequence.  
 
Other agencies have a more peripheral role, but nonetheless feature earthquake related activities 
in their work-streams. The Department of Corrections for example reports that by 31 March 2014 
offenders in prison and in the community had contributed over 192,000 hours to earthquake 
recovery work including houses transported from the Residential Red Zone to prison yards where 
they are refurbished for social housing20. 
 
Existing review of service-delivery connectedness 
 
While it is not the focus of this paper, it is worth noting that there is on-going work in relation to 
how agencies have connected from a service delivery perspective in Canterbury. The Cabinet paper 
Demonstrating Better Public Services: Christchurch Innovations observes the innovative responses of the 
Public Service in Canterbury demonstrated the value of “co-location and collaboration between 
agencies as a foundation for joined up services, to reduce agency silos and to enable efficiencies 
through shared infrastructure”21. The paper identifies four examples of innovative public service 
delivery: 
 
 Canterbury District Health Board’s shared care record view (eSCRV), an on-line cloud-
based system for sharing patient information between health professionals;  
 Recovery Canterbury, a joint private/public hub supporting earthquake-affected 
businesses with advice, mentoring, referrals (to government as well as professional 
services) and grants; 
 Justice Services Recovery, including centralised scheduling and the use of alternative 
facilities that enabled the maintenance of court proceedings despite significant damage 
to infrastructure; 
 Earthquake Support Co-Ordination (ESCS), co-production between government 
agencies and NGOs to provide support for families and households following the 
earthquakes. 
These initiatives demonstrate the value in public sector agencies identifying opportunities to do 
things differently and to work together in disaster response, in a way that can be emulated across 
                                                        
18 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, (2013), Rangers Park Development, Posted at 
http://www.mbie.govt.nz/what-we-do/canterbury-recovery/snapshots/rangers-park-development, Retrieved 9 
September 2014 
19 Earthquake Commission, (2014), Canterbury Home Repair Target Date for 2014, Posted at 
http://www.eqc.govt.nz/news/canterbury-home-repair-target-date-for-2014 , Retrieved 9 September 2014 
20 Department of Corrections, (2014), ‘Helping Rebuild Canterbury’, Correction Works, June 2014, pp 8-9  
21 CAB, (Demonstrating Better Public Services: Christchurch Innovations, Paper to the Cabinet State Sector Reform and 
Expenditure Control Committee, p1 
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the sector during ordinary-times. In particular, the paper identifies lessons from Christchurch that 
“enable innovation to flourish”22. 
 
  
                                                        
22 Ibid, p2 
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PART ONE: CONNECTEDNESS – PRESCRIBED AND PREPARED?  
 
Connectedness is a major theme in the experience of individuals and agencies involved in the 
government response. At a basic level, the benefits of being connected are clear. Connectedness 
reduces the risk of duplication of efforts, best ensures consistency in decision-making, and 
provides for existing capabilities across agencies to be identified and utilised.  Equally, the 
challenges of creating connectedness in response to a disaster are great. Decisions need to be made 
at lightning pace while decision-makers are still discovering the scale of the disaster and the 
particular features of the affected location. An individual agency cannot be expected to keep 
abreast of the activities of every other agency, with so many actions occurring concurrently.  
 
Within government there are multiple ministerial portfolios, supported by a vast number of central 
government agencies, including 29 public service departments, and 62 statutory Crown entities23. 
The structure of division by portfolio can lend itself to agencies carrying out tasks in isolation and 
the system can contain silos both within and between agencies. As Morrison observed, the public 
sector reforms of the 1980s have resulted in agencies becoming “overly protective of their policy, 
information and operations. What gets lost in the fragmentation is the collective action required 
to deliver the common good”24. A disaster setting could either accentuate the challenges, or make 
them easier to overcome. The “common good” at least will be more visible to agencies, although 
the ideas for how to achieve it may be harder to agree.  
 
There are mechanisms by which some level of connectedness is ensured, depending on the 
significance of the particular decision. To the extent that Cabinet approval is required before an 
action is taken, the Cabinet paper put before the relevant committee must confirm what other 
agencies the department has consulted with25, and Cabinet itself is a way of ensuring relevant 
Ministers are kept informed. There are also cross-agency groups set up to manage particular issues, 
but in other cases the structure relies on agencies using initiative, and common sense, to identify 
scenarios where others will need to be involved, and cooperating to achieve the common good. 
 
Prescribed connectedness in disasters 
 
A further vehicle for prescribing greater connectedness is the Civil Defence Emergency 
Management framework, which sets out the principles and plans for emergency management in 
New Zealand, including the roles and responsibilities at a local level and national level.  The detail 
is in a series of documents sitting underneath the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002. 
These include the Strategy26 set by the Minister, the Plan27 made by the Governor-General through 
Order in Council, and the Guide28 as endorsed by the government. Underneath those documents 
there are also individual Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Plans, and a range of 
Director’s guidelines. 
 
                                                        
23 Excluding the twenty District Health Boards. See State Services Commission, A Guide to New Zealand’s Central 
Government Agencies, Posted at http://www.ssc.govt.nz/sites/all/files/guide-to-central-govt-agencies-1jul14.pdf, 
Retrieved 1 July 2014 
24 Morrison, A., (2014), “Picking Up the Pace in Public Services”, Policy Quarterly, May, p43 
25 Cabinet Office, Cab Guide – Departmental Consultation, Posted at 
http://cabguide.cabinetoffice.govt.nz/procedures/consultation/departmental-consultation, Retrieved on 9 
September 2014 
26 Minister for Civil Defence, (2007), Civil Defence Emergency Management Strategy 2007, Department of Internal Affairs, 
Wellington 
27 National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2005 
28 Director of Civil Defence Emergency Management, (2006), The Guide to the National Civil Defence Emergency 
Management Plan 2006, Ministry of Civil Defence Emergency Management, Wellington 
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Under the framework, ODESC (the Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security 
Coordination) is the strategic body responsible for co-ordinating a whole-of-government response 
to events29. ODESC is chaired by the Chief Executive of the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet. In an emergency management context, ODESC brings together Chief Executives from 
across government to determine the extent to which government intervention and action is 
required, and to allocate work across agencies.  
 
The National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 2006 also provides that following notification 
or warning of a civil defence emergency, national agencies with lead roles are to act in support of 
government crisis management arrangements. Emergencies requiring a whole-of-government 
response may require activation of the National Crisis Management Centre (or the “Bunker”) by 
ODESC30. Agencies with supporting roles, as set out in the Plan, may be required to provide ad 
hoc or full-time representation and support at the Bunker. This physical locating of representatives 
from different agencies is an immediate way to achieve connectedness in relation to Response 
activities.  
 
The framework also introduces a form of connectedness through the operation of “clusters” of 
agencies, which are set up with the aim of encouraging organisations with similar objectives to 
work together. Clusters were introduced in the 2002 Act to put some structure around existing 
relationships31. The cluster members are intended to work together to clarify goals, responsibilities 
and roles, identify gaps in capability and capacity, and address the gaps through action plans. They 
include clusters dedicated to the likes of Welfare, Emergency Services, Lifeline Utilities, Health, 
and Transport. For example, according to the Guide, the National Welfare Recovery Co-ordination 
Group, led by the Ministry of Social Development, is responsible for planning for the delivery of 
national welfare when assistance or support is required to be co-ordinated at a national level. For 
more information about how the Civil Defence Emergency Management framework played out 
in Canterbury, you can refer to the report Review of Civil Defence Emergency Management Response to the 
22 February Christchurch Earthquake32. 
 
Identifying the Canterbury cases 
 
Through a combination of existing consultation procedures across government, and through the 
operation of the Civil Defence Emergency Management framework, there are mechanisms in place 
to facilitate connectedness in a disaster response, but the remainder of this paper considers specific 
examples of connectedness that occurred, in part, outside of this framework. In particular, the 
research included individuals who were part of: the Chimney Replacement Programme, the Engineering 
Advisory Group, the provision of Temporary Accommodation, and the Proposed Perimeter Treatment Works. 
These particular actions or roles were of interest because they involved two or more government 
agencies. The facts and observations from these are set out in the following sections. 
  
                                                        
29 Clause 12(7)(d) of the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 2006  
30 Clause 64 of the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 2006 
31 Ministry of Civil Defence Emergency Management, A Cluster Approach for Civil Defence Emergency Management: 
Enhancing Multi-Agency Relationships, Posted at 
http://www.civildefence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/publications/Cluster-Approach-Fact-Sheet.pdf, Retrieved on 9 
September 2014 
32 Ellis, E., McLean, I., Oughton, D., Rubin, C. B., Wakelin, B., (2012), Review of Civil Defence Emergency Management 
Response to the 22 February Christchurch Earthquake, Wellington 
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PART 2: OBSERVATIONS ON CONNECTEDNESS 
 
The role of existing relationships 
 
Interviewees repeatedly stressed the importance of existing relationships between individuals 
across agencies and the value of being able to draw on those to activate work-streams. A key 
example was the creation of the Engineering Advisory Group, which utilised existing relationships 
between EQC, Department of Building and Housing, and specific members of the earthquake 
engineering community. Technical societies such as the New Zealand Society for Earthquake 
Engineering, the Structural Engineering Society of New Zealand and the New Zealand 
Geotechnical Society provided an important mechanism to forge and strengthen relationships. 
 
 
 
Case 1: The Engineering Advisory Group 
 
MBIE describes the Canterbury Earthquakes Engineering Advisory Group as having three 
main purposes33: 
 
 To provide guidance on engineering requirements and regulatory processes for the 
assessment of damage and specification of repair and reconstruction; 
 To facilitate interaction between engineers, EQC, commercial insurers, CERA, and 
Christchurch City, Selwyn District, and Waimakariri District councils on the engineering 
requirements and regulatory issues and processes; 
 To convey the engineering requirements for various repair and reconstruction options and 
techniques to the insurance, design and construction sectors. 
 
While the Engineering Advisory Group now sits within MBIE, the Group was originally 
sponsored by EQC to consider the technical issues and processes associated with the recovery 
for residential dwellings. At that time it comprised members from EQC, the Department of 
Building and Housing, BRANZ, the Structural Engineering Society, and engineering 
consultants Tonkin & Taylor Limited. It has since grown to incorporate a range of 
engineering expertise across both residential and commercial buildings. 
 
The Group did not exist prior to the earthquakes but the Canterbury Earthquakes Royal 
Commission recommended that the EAG continue as an on-going function and this 
recommendation has been accepted by government. It is currently supporting MBIE in 
addressing lessons from Canterbury, both to support the rebuild and to implement changes 
throughout New Zealand. 
 
 
 
The prompt creation of the Group was crucial in ensuring that the right expertise was brought 
together and, critically, that no time was lost in carrying out technical analysis of the complexities 
of the damage to the land and to buildings. This was vital in allowing the government to issue 
much needed guidance to councils, design and building professionals, and homeowners to facilitate 
the commencement of repairs in damaged areas. Had the government not had both the research 
understanding facilitated by EQC and the in-house engineering function through the Chief 
Engineer at the Department of Building and Housing, and had a working relationship not already 
existed between those parties, it is not clear what role the government could have had in facilitating 
                                                        
33 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, Engineering Advisory Group, Posted at 
http://www.dbh.govt.nz/canterbury-earthquake-eag#objectives, Retrieved on 9 September 2014 
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the residential (and eventually commercial) aspects of the rebuild. In any case, the existing 
networks and relationships both between these agencies and within the engineering profession 
proved invaluable in providing a connected response from government on this issue. 
 
In acknowledging the value of this Group, it is worth considering previous engagements between 
the parties and the role they played in building the relationships. For example, prior to the 
earthquakes the then Department of Building and Housing and EQC, through its statutory 
research function, had engaged with territorial authorities regarding the operation of new 
provisions in the Building Act 2004, which require each territorial authority to adopt a policy on 
earthquake-prone buildings within its district and to provide a copy to the Chief Executive of the 
Department by mid-2006 to be reviewed within five years34. The Department of Building and 
Housing and EQC ran workshops with the various territorial authorities to help ensure the 
authorities’ policies would be in line with best practice and the relevant research.  
 
Through this work, there was an on-going relationship between EQC and the Department of 
Building and Housing, and through other aspects of EQC’s research role, there were pre-existing 
relationships with the engineering profession both in relation to structural design and geotechnical 
knowledge. As such, when the Canterbury earthquake struck, EQC was immediately able to draw 
on those relationships, and on its proven capacity to facilitate, to gather the relevant expertise from 
across the public and private sector and form the Engineering Advisory Group.   
  
For the Department of Building and Housing, the appreciation of existing relationships is not 
limited to the creation of the Engineering Advisory Group. Four years on from the event, MBIE 
(within which the roles of the Department now sit) maintains a Canterbury Recovery Programme 
covering the range of roles various parts of MBIE have played. It has responsibility for the 
Engineering Advisory Group (and the guidance issued as a result), and led “Operation Suburb”, 
which involved recruiting a skilled workforce from around the country to assess building damage 
and ensure the safety and welfare of residents in Christchurch following the February 201135. In 
addition the Department played a key role in supporting the Canterbury Earthquakes Royal 
Commission of Inquiry’s investigation in to the causes of building failure as a result of the 
earthquakes36.  
 
The Department’s role in the government’s response throughout both the Response and Recovery 
phases was large, and in many instances unanticipated. Some of the roles that were taken on by 
the Department could logically have fallen elsewhere, particularly in relation to the provision of 
temporary accommodation, where one might have expected Housing New Zealand Corporation 
to take the leading role37. 
 
It is interesting that the Department, which was only established in 2004, did not have a significant 
relationship with the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management prior to the 
earthquakes. However, not much earlier, the Department had sponsored, in association with the 
Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, a Building Safety Evaluation initiative of 
the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering. This initiative adopted a coloured placard 
system (red, yellow, and green) to use in assessing damaged buildings. The system was first used 
                                                        
34 See section 131 of the Building Act 2004 
35 Office of the Auditor-General, (2012), Efficiency Stories – Department of Building and Housing: Massive Mobilisations for 
Operation Suburb, Wellington 
36 The Royal Commission of Inquiry commenced in April 2011 and concluded in November 2012, see The 
Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission at http://canterbury.royalcommission.govt.nz/ 
37 The decision to allocate this work to the Department of Building and Housing was likely due to the significant 
policy decisions that needed to be made at the outset, allowing Housing New Zealand Corporation to be utilised to 
provide operational advice to the Department. 
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for the Gisborne earthquake of 20 December 200738 and was sponsored by the Department of 
Building and Housing to be rolled out nationwide after the Gisborne event. As a part of this, the 
Department was invited to ODESC with the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management to present the coloured notice system, and to recommend its adoption nationwide. 
This contact with both ODESC and with the Ministry put the Department squarely in sight of 
these emergency management bodies, where it might otherwise have been overlooked. It also 
formed part of the Department’s role on the ground in Canterbury in the immediate response to 
the 4 September event.  
 
The importance of agency credibility 
 
For existing relationships to be effectively utilised a further element is required. Whether in 
response to a natural disaster or simply in the everyday activities of government, people or agencies 
with a proven track record of achieving will naturally be the first to be allocated a new task or 
project. The importance of credibility in the Canterbury context has been demonstrated in both 
the allocation of tasks from the government to a particular agency, and also in the willingness of 
agencies to work together. An example is the Department of Building and Housing’s involvement 
in the investigations around the collapse of buildings, and in the Department’s related contribution 
to the Royal Commission of Inquiry.  
 
On 18 September 2010, a fortnight after the first earthquake, the roof of the Southland Stadium 
collapsed following a heavy snowfall in the area. Naturally, there was serious concern around how 
the design and construction of the stadium might have contributed to the collapse, particularly as 
it was only eleven years old. The Department of Building and Housing decided to commission a 
technical investigation into the collapse of the roof to determine the cause of the failure and to 
take any recommendations on necessary modifications to the Building Code or design and 
construction practices. The investigation by the Department was not a requirement at law. While 
the Department had statutory functions under the Building Act 2004 in relation to issuing technical 
guidance on the Building Code39, there is no automatic assumption that the government should 
have a role in investigating a particular building’s performance. However, in this case, it was 
determined that an investigation should be done, and the Department volunteered itself. 
 
The performance of particular buildings was again brought to the fore following the catastrophic 
collapse of several buildings in the Christchurch Central Business District from the earthquake on 
22 February 2011. As a result of its experience with the Southland Stadium, the Department 
understood the role it could play again in investigating building collapse, albeit in entirely different 
and far more sensitive circumstances. This time, the decision to be part of the investigation into 
what caused the collapse of the buildings had to be made swiftly due to the scale of the damage 
and the fact that the clues to the investigation would be amongst the rubble, which would likely 
soon be moved. 
 
The Department’s existing credibility came into play in two ways as it picked up the role of carrying 
out the technical investigation into the collapse of four multi-storey buildings in the Central 
Business District: The Pyne Gould Corporation, Forsyth Barr, Hotel Grand Chancellor, and 
Canterbury Television (CTV). Firstly, because of the Department’s role in commissioning the 
                                                        
38 The magnitude 6.7 earthquake struck off the coast from Gisborne and caused damage to chimneys and buildings 
at several places along the East Coast, particularly in the Gisborne Central Business District. See Geonet, M 6.7, 
Gisborne, 20 December 2007, Posted at 
http://info.geonet.org.nz/display/quake/M+6.7%2C+Gisborne%2C+20+December+2007, Retrieved on 9 
September 2014 
39 Section 11(e) of the Building Act 2004 
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Southland Stadium investigation, Ministers could have confidence that the Department could 
repeat its work and apply its experience to the buildings in Christchurch. Secondly because of the 
Department’s work with the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management in sponsoring 
the placarding system (see above) and its leadership role in the engineering advice in Canterbury 
the Department had the necessary relationships and credibility with the National Controller John 
Hamilton to immediately commence collection of vital information from the sites while the state 
of emergency was still very much in place. 
 
While it may seem that it goes without saying that those who have already proven themselves 
capable will be the ones looked to in an emergency, the experience of the Department of Building 
and Housing in Canterbury raises two questions: 
 
 Had that credibility not existed from the Southland Stadium, would there have been a role 
for government at all in the investigation of the collapses in Christchurch? 
 
 And, how can the lessons from this be drawn through to planning for the next time. Should 
this be left to chance as it was in Canterbury, or should there be analysis of how roles 
emerged in that response such that planning processes for future events recognise existing 
credibility as a factor in determining roles? 
 
Implementing broader government policies in recovery work 
 
In some instances the work required (or opportunities identified) relied on connecting two or more 
agencies who had no prior relationship.  
 
 
Case 2: The Chimney Replacement Programme 
 
The Chimney Replacement programme involved two main agencies: the Energy Efficiency 
and Conservation Authority, and EQC. A key feature of the damage to residential buildings 
in Canterbury from the 4 September 2010 event was the large number of chimneys that were 
damaged or brought down by the earthquake. Initial reports were that EQC had received 
15,000 claims for chimney damage from the first earthquake40.  
 
On 15 September 2010, just 11 days after the first earthquake, the Minster for Energy and 
Resources Gerry Brownlee announced “Cantabrians whose chimneys have been significantly 
damaged by the recent earthquake will be able to replace their old log burners or open fires 
with a new, efficient heater and the cost will be covered under their claim to EQC”41. It was 
described by Minister Brownlee as being more cost effective in most cases to decommission 
or remove a damaged chimney and install an efficient heater than it is to repair or rebuild it, 
and was presented as an opportunity to fix old, inefficient heaters that contributed to 
Christchurch’s air quality issues. Accordingly, the Energy Efficiency Conservation Authority 
(a Crown Entity within Minister Brownlee’s portfolio) took up the task of managing the 
scheme in line with its statutory role to promote energy efficiency across the country. The 
process that eventuated was for the Authority to take claims from EQC where the only repairs 
required to the property were for the damaged chimney. The Authority would take over the 
obligations of principal in arranging the work to replace the damaged chimney for individual 
properties, and would invoice EQC in bulk for the work done.  
                                                        
40 Smith, Hon Dr N., (2010), 666 NZDP 14064  
41 Brownlee, Hon G., (2010), Quake Claims to Cover New, Efficient Heating, Media Release, Wellington 
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In principle, the initiative was an excellent way of achieving an increase in the energy 
efficiency of Canterbury homes, and demonstrating the “building back better” ethos. In 
practice, as with many aspects of the Canterbury recovery, the complexities involved in every 
step of the process were massively challenging. Even the first step of identifying properties 
where the building had only suffered damage to the chimney and was therefore capable of 
being managed in isolation was problematic. This coupled with issues with adequate invoicing 
of work by contractors, and in facilitating the relationships between the two agencies made 
the work an extraordinary challenge. 
 
Nevertheless, around 800 chimneys were dealt with through the Programme by the Energy 
Efficiency and Conservation Authority before the earthquake on 22 February 201142. That 
earthquake caused such extensive damage that it simply became unfeasible for the initiative 
to remain with the Authority. By that time EQC had appointed Fletcher Construction 
Corporation as Project Management Office for the Canterbury Home Repair Programme, 
and so the initiative was rolled into that broader programme. In all, as at 14 February 2014 
18,86743 repairs or replacements of heating appliances have been completed, which can be 
seen as making an enormous contribution to the health and wellbeing of the community. The 
Chimney Replacement Programme is remarkable as an example of connectedness in that it 
came about so quickly after the first earthquake and because it involved two agencies with no 
prior working relationship.  
 
Directly after the September 2010 event, EQC was entirely occupied both in assessing damaged 
properties and in up-scaling from the 22 staff it had to the 1000 staff it would have by Christmas44. 
Meanwhile, the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority was already involved in Canterbury 
through the Warm Up New Zealand: Heat Smart initiative, which provided subsidies for insulation 
and clean heating in homes. Through this, the Authority had experience in running a service model 
contracting parties to deliver services. It also had existing relationships with the Christchurch City 
Council and Environment Canterbury through this work.  
 
When the call was made by the government for agencies to identify opportunities to contribute in 
Canterbury, the Authority considered its existing capabilities and existing relationships with local 
government and contractors could be translated into the earthquake repair process. The 
connection was made that there was an opportunity to link this with EQC’s obligation to settle 
insurance claims for damaged chimneys and so the two agencies were thrown together in 
facilitating the initiative. 
 
This task required two agencies to build an instantaneous working relationship, without which the 
programme could not have started and may well have been overlooked as being non-essential 
when there were a myriad of other mandatory tasks. Interviewees observed that following through 
with the initiative required agencies to accept levels of risk that would not normally be appetising, 
and to create a relationship of trust where no prior relationship existed at all. At a decision-making 
level, this had to happen chief executive to chief executive and there had to be a clear mandate 
from the Minister for the programme to progress. At an operational level, part of the 
connectedness came through the agencies choosing to co-locate, with the relevant members of the 
Authority’s staff occupying desks in the warehouse building used by EQC.  
 
                                                        
42 Earthquake Commission, (2011), Briefing to the Incoming Minister, Wellington, p15 
43 Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, (2014), Canterbury WellbeingIndex Risk Factors, Posted at 
http://cera.govt.nz/sites/default/files/common/canterbury-wellbeing-index-june-2014-sec08-risk-factors.pdf, 
Retrieved 1 September 2014 
44 Chief Ombudsman, and Privacy Commissioner, p10 
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It is commendable that the agencies involved were willing to take the opportunity, to accept the 
level of risk, and to make all efforts to ensure the initiative worked. Despite the extraordinary 
difficulties, and the eventual appreciation that the task was too big to manage in isolation from the 
rest of the repair programme, the Programme has been a success in terms of results. The 
experience brings to light two important aspects of the government’s role in Canterbury: 
 
 What other opportunities may exist to align mandatory work in disaster response with 
other unrelated government policies – and when these do exist, how do agencies balance 
the benefit of taking them on with the risk of delay, cost increase, and failure? and 
 
 How much easier could this engagement and others have been if there had been a pre-
existing relationship between the agencies, or if there had been a whole-of-government 
plan in place prior to any disaster that required agencies to identify where opportunities 
could lie, and to build relationships in support of that? 
These concepts are discussed further in this paper, but it is worth noting that subsequent to this 
engagement, the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority has been successful in working 
with EQC (as well as private insurers) to ensure that homeowners who are having their properties 
repaired are given the opportunity to install insulation while the wall-linings are down as part of 
the repair. Generally, if these walls were not insulated prior to the earthquakes, the homeowner is 
not entitled to have insulation installed. In Canterbury, while the insulation is not being carried out 
by the insurer, giving the homeowner the opportunity to install it while the wall-linings are 
removed is another way the Authority has achieved some of its broader policy objectives in the 
rebuild. This may have been overlooked had this new relationship not been fostered by the work 
on the Chimney Replacement Programme.   
 
The value of information     
 
The diagram in the introduction to this paper starts to paint a picture of the number of agencies 
who had a role in the Canterbury response. One aspect of this that should not be overlooked is 
the amount of information being collated and created by individual agencies in carrying out their 
activities. The success of a whole-of-government response can hinge on the ability of that 
information to cross between agencies or to be overlaid in some kind of central facility.  
 
The value of being able to access and share information in responding to a natural disaster is 
demonstrated by the types of information held by different agencies. For example, following the 
22 February 2011 earthquake EQC was tasked with carrying out emergency repairs to all residential 
properties, even those properties for which there was no insurance and who fall outside of EQC’s 
cover45. The driver for this was that there was significant risk to health and wellbeing across 
Christchurch, and with the end of summer approaching the imperatives for carrying out emergency 
repairs to weather-proof homes was clear. EQC had established its repair Project Management 
Office and was best placed to carry out these emergency works. 
 
The need for information gathering for this role was two-fold. Firstly, EQC needed to determine 
what properties needed repairs, which would be difficult in relation to uninsured properties as only 
those with insurance should have made claims to EQC. Uninsured properties would not generally 
be on EQC’s radar. Secondly, if EQC was to prioritise repairs for people and families most at risk, 
in terms of health and needs, it needed to determine who those people were. Broadly speaking, 
                                                        
45 Brownlee, Hon G., (2011), ‘Direction to Earthquake Commission Pursuant to section 12 of the Earthquake 
Commission Act 1993’, New Zealand Gazette, Issue 51, 14 April 2011, go2390, p1208   
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prior to the earthquakes EQC did not hold information about anyone in Christchurch. Following 
the earthquakes there was an enormous influx of information, but it related to the property and 
the type of damage that had been sustained. Generally, EQC would not be receiving information 
about the health and wellbeing of the occupants, although in an ad-hoc way this would have come 
up in some conversations with customers.  
 
As it turned out EQC carried out a rapid assessment programme of door-to-door assessments 
with the aim of triaging properties with minor, moderate, and severe damage so that full 
assessments of severely damaged properties could be prioritised. This allowed EQC to build a 
picture of damage across the city, and gave the government the opportunity to use the information 
to inform the broader response. In the first instance emergency repairs could be carried out on 
properties identified through this process as housing vulnerable people or where the main source 
of heating had been lost46.  
 
From this experience, and the ongoing challenges EQC faces in terms of addressing the needs of 
its vulnerable customers, clearly there is substantial benefit in understanding where relevant 
information is, and how it could be utilised in such a response as part of whole-of-government 
planning. For example, EQC was not the only agency visiting properties, and there was potential 
for information about individuals’ needs to be shared by those participating in Operation Suburb 
as described earlier in this paper. 
 
Of course, any sharing of personal information like this needs to be balanced with the risks to the 
privacy of individuals. This balance is acknowledged in information privacy principle 11 of the 
Privacy Act 1993 which provides for personal information to be disclosed whether necessary to 
prevent or lessen a serious threat to the life or health of an individual. In the Canterbury context, 
to expand on this and to avoid any confusion, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner issued a 
formal Code of Practice47 following the 22 February 2011 earthquake to facilitate agencies sharing 
personal information for the purpose of identifying and assisting people who may be in need in 
relation to the emergency. 
 
At a broader level the value of information is not limited to information about individuals, and 
how those individuals’ needs are best met. Information at a higher, more general level is hugely 
valuable to agencies working in the response. For example, the Department of Building and 
Housing was tasked with providing temporary accommodation villages, but had no sense of the 
number of people that would need the accommodation, where those people would generally be 
living in Canterbury, and when the need would likely be at its highest.  
 
Case 3: The provision of  temporary accommodation 
 
The 22 February 2011 earthquake resulted in the declaration of a state of national emergency 
and escalated the government’s role in responding to the situation48. The government 
determined that it was to have a role in providing emergency and temporary accommodation 
to persons displaced by the earthquake.  
 
The responsibility for establishing the temporary housing, both emergency and longer term, 
was allocated to the then Department of Building and Housing. The need for housing 
appeared immediate and decisions on the government’s contribution to this had to be made 
swiftly – with no pre-existing plans or experience in New Zealand for how this would look, 
                                                        
46 Earthquake Commission, (2011), Briefing to the Incoming Minister, Wellington, p13 
47 Christchurch Earthquake (Information Sharing) Code 2011 (Temporary) 
48 Carter 
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policy options had to be devised, considered, and put to Ministers within extremely short 
timeframes. The decision was reached that there would be a phased approach to 
accommodation49: 
 
 Stage 1 – Immediate Temporary Accommodation: The first tranche of accommodation 
was provided by the government securing 35050 campervans from private companies and 
locating them on Canterbury Agricultural Park. The demand for the campervans was far 
less than expected and the uptake was very low. Stage 1 was also to include transportable 
accommodation units described as container-type dwellings, which were intended to be 
placed on individual properties for residents to live in while their repairs were in progress. 
Logistically, this became impracticable and “for a range of reasons”51 was not progressed.  
 Stage 2 – Imminent Temporary Accommodation: The second phase was to introduce 
temporary accommodation villages. There are currently three villages at Kaiapoi Domain, 
Linwood Park, and Rawhiti Domain. The village units are let through CETAS (Canterbury 
Earthquake Temporary Accommodation Service), which is a joint venture between MBIE 
and the Ministry of Social Development. The Ministry of Social Development is 
accountable for providing the overall management of the service as well as providing 
assessment functions, service coordination and financial assistance. MBIE is accountable 
for coordinating procurement and delivery of temporary villages, including working with 
local councils to establish appropriate land and negotiate arrangements for use. 
 Stage 3 – Temporary Housing: The third stage is the proposed Rangers Park development, 
a permanent housing subdivision. Minister of Housing Dr Nick Smith announced in April 
2013 that the development of 40 new homes will be used to “increase the supply of 
temporary accommodation for families as the rebuild gains momentum.”52 The houses 
will be sold once demand for temporary accommodation has lessened. 
 
Each of the stages was led by the Department of Building and Housing, but in part required 
input from a variety of agencies including the Ministry for the Environment, Department 
of Conservation, the New Zealand Police and Fire Service, the Treasury, and Ministry of 
Social Development. For example, the development of the temporary villages required land 
to be located and secured (both Crown and Council land were considered), and legislative 
change (through Orders in Council under the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 
amending the Resource Management Act 1991 and the Reserves Act 1977). 
 
 
 
The Department worked with insurers and with EQC to try to determine the likely level of need 
and timing of accommodation, in terms of when repairs would likely commence. The initiative to 
use insurance claim information was only ever going to be a best guess at what the volumes and 
timing would be and was an ad hoc approach to achieving some snapshot of the reality. 
 
In hindsight this approach has a lot of merit, and there is certainly an opportunity on this aspect 
alone to consider how agencies tasked with taking on responsibility for temporary accommodation 
in ordinary-time planning, could build relationships and understanding with agencies like EQC 
and the private insurance industry so that those agencies can prepare to collect information as part 
of their claims process in a manner that will be useful to the housing provider next time around. 
                                                        
49 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, (2013), Evaluation of the Canterbury Temporary Villages, 
Wellington, p6 
50 Williams, D., (2011), ‘$2.84m Spent on Scrapped Housing Scheme’, The Press, 14 October 2011 
51 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, (2013), Evaluation of the Canterbury Temporary Villages, 
Wellington, p6 
52 Smith, Hon Dr N., (2013), Government Steps Up Christchurch Housing Response, Media Release, Wellington   
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Frameworks could then be built in advance for how that information will be shared and analysed 
with systems ready to go should a disaster strike. 
 
Of course, the biggest challenge to optimising the use of information in this environment is 
understanding what information exists, who holds it, and how can agencies share it with each other 
or bring it together in a way that allows them to carry out their activities better. The difficulties 
with this are not unique to an emergency scenario, but are certainly enhanced when the need for 
the information is immediate and when data is rapidly changing.  If there was a framework that 
provided for these information sets to be laid across each-other, it would provide the ability to 
identify need in an ordered and considered way, rather than on an ad hoc basis. 
 
Connecting through a central team  
 
While in many instances connectedness appears to have been achieved through enhancement of 
existing relationships, there are examples where a more formalised point of connectedness was 
established. In particular, after the first earthquake, policy support was required for the new 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Ministerial portfolio. The Policy Advisory Group within the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, which is often tasked with providing specialist policy 
advice on issues of particular importance, established the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Policy 
Team (the “Recovery Team”) to facilitate the provision of advice to Ministers.  
 
The Recovery Team consisted of secondments from across the public sector bringing together 
staff who had the necessary subject matter expertise and proficiency in taking matters to Cabinet. 
It provided a central point for policy development, with members able to connect back to their 
individual agencies where response work also continued. It was an effective way of linking agencies 
and enabling a single point of contact (or at least a starting point) for Ministers. The Recovery 
Team also carried out the secretariat role to the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Commission for 
the approval of Orders in Council to be made under the Canterbury Earthquake Response and Recovery 
Act 2010.  
 
The Recovery Team’s main focus was on thinking through the policy implications for the Recovery 
phase in both the medium and longer term. This is a crucial, yet demanding task to carry out in 
the midst of a disaster response, so having a team dedicated to turning its mind to these issues was 
a useful approach. In order for the Recovery Team’s vision to be achieved, it also needed to have 
sufficient mandate and credibility, without which individual agencies may either continue in their 
own pursuits, or act within their individual policy objectives alone. It is perhaps useful then that 
this team was established within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, the agency that 
was already facilitating (at least) daily response meetings with Chief Executives, and which naturally 
carries a degree of weight in terms of Departmental status.  
 
The success or otherwise of the government as a whole in keeping an eye on the later stages of 
Recovery is not analysed in this research, but the work done by the Recovery Team is 
acknowledged to the extent that it might be usefully formalised in planning frameworks for “next 
time”. Certainly, it is not sufficient to rely on individual agencies to keep an eye on the longer term 
in a way that is consistent with every other agency’s vision. There needs to be a central point of 
connectedness, which might usefully formalise this ad hoc approach adopted in Canterbury. 
 
Any administrative difficulties and delays in the establishment of such a team could be minimised 
by establishing the structure of the team in advance. For example, relevant agencies could be 
required to have a senior policy advisor nominated at all times ready to join the team if an event 
occurs. In line with the emphasis above on existing relationships and credibility, the team could 
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meet regularly to hold “practice-runs” on thinking through the issues that come to play in the 
Recovery phase, and how a government’s role might differ depending on the type of disaster, and 
the location or economic impact. While you can certainly not prepare for every eventuality, the 
benefit of the existing relationships and structure is that it will be ready to activate when required 
rather than starting from scratch each time. Naturally, particular subject matter expertise will be 
needed on a case-by-case basis, and so secondments will vary and be added to, but the base 
structure and default agencies will be well established.  
 
Further to this, secondments and resource sharing could be utilised in a wider sense across 
agencies. For example, EQC faced an enormous task in managing the processing of claims across 
Canterbury, and in carrying out the repairs on 70,000 homes through the Canterbury Home Repair 
Programme. In addition to the tasks that are specific to claims processing and project management, 
EQC also had to employ staff to manage significant increases in demand on  (1) human resources, 
(2) finance, (3) information requests, (4) call centre operations (5) communications, (6) information 
technology, and (7) Board and Ministerial servicing. 
 
Many of the above tasks are more than familiar to other government agencies and form part of 
their everyday business. All agencies deal with information requests and have corporate teams to 
manage human resources, finance, contracting. Given the extraordinary growth of EQC, and of 
other organisations like CERA, there may be opportunities to explore in terms of how these 
capabilities can be drawn on from across government as part of disaster planning. 
 
 
 
Case 4: Proposed perimeter treatment works 
 
The impact of the 4 September 2010 earthquake on the land around Canterbury was immediately 
apparent through the extensive liquefaction in Kaiapoi and some suburbs in East Christchurch. As 
explained by GNS, “Close to the coast there are many layers of finer-grained sediment, such as sand, 
silt and clay. During the earthquake, the shaking turned some of the layers of sand and silt to liquid 
mush. The ground above the liquidised layers spread laterally, cracking the ground, footpaths, roads 
and houses”53. Given the scale of the damage, and the desire to provide confidence to affected 
communities, banks, and insurers to rebuild in those damaged areas54, the government gave urgent 
priority to investigating work that could be done to repair and remediate land that had been severely 
damaged55. The proposal was for work to be done on a significant scale, that would involve complex, 
area wide, multi-scale and multi-party engineering solutions.  
 
The government designated EQC to work with both the Christchurch City Council and Waimakariri 
District Council to develop those solutions and get the work underway. Using his powers of direction 
under the Earthquake Commission Act 1993, the Minister of Finance made an initial direction to EQC 
to investigate options for mitigating further earthquake damage to land damaged throughout the 
region. The EQC, along with its contracted engineers Tonkin & Taylor set to work with both the 
Treasury and the two Councils to establish a framework for how the remediation would be carried 
out, working through a myriad of complexities around funding and liability, and plans for how to 
                                                        
53 Geonet, 2010 Darfiled (Canterbury) Earthquake, Posted at http://www.gns.cri.nz/Home/Our-Science/Natural-
Hazards/Recent-Events/Canterbury-quake/Darfield-Earthquake, Retrieved on 9 September 2014 
54 Earthquake Commission, (2011), Briefing to the Incoming Minister, Wellington, p17 
55 Ministry for the Environment, (2011), Regulatory Impact Statement – Options for Expediting RMA Consent Application 
Processes for Land Remediation in Canterbury under the Canterbury Earthquake Response and Recovery Act 2010, Posted at 
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/informationreleases/ris/pdfs/ris-mfe-ermalr-mar11.pdf, Retrieved 9 
September 2010 
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manage instances where some works had to be carried out on private land. The scale of the work was 
unprecedented and of itself negotiations between the Crown and the Councils were challenging.  
 
In addition to these complexities, the parties identified a number of other hurdles that would need to 
be managed before the work could progress, including statutory limits on how the work could be 
carried out. There were concerns around the application of the Building Act 2004 to the proposed 
underground structures, the Resource Management Act 1991 in terms of the application of 
consultation requirements, and the Reserves Act 1977 in terms of use of reserve land. As such there 
was a need for connectedness with both the Department of Building and Housing, the Ministry for 
the Environment, the Department for Internal Affairs, and the Department of Conservation. This 
resulted in the use of orders in council under the Canterbury Earthquake Response and Recovery Act 
2010. 
 
As it turned out, the proposed works in Waimakariri and Christchurch never eventuated. Aside from 
any of the difficulties that still had to be worked through, the scale of land damage caused by 
subsequent earthquakes in the sequence made the proposals untenable. The combined damage meant 
the government had to think through the wider interests of the occupiers of the land and alternative 
ways to provide the desired certainty to them, such that eventually land zoning was announced. 
Nevertheless, the proposed work involved a variety of central government departments, crown 
entities, and local councils, and presents a useful example of how agencies connected in the 
government’s response. 
 
It is also interesting that the task was allocated to EQC despite it being outside its normal statutory 
role and that the funding was coming directly from the Crown - there was no expectation that any of 
the remediation work would fall under EQC’s statutory cover, particularly as much of it was to be 
carried out on council and Crown land.  It is an interesting example of an agency having to take on 
an entirely unprecedented and unforeseen role in contributing to the Recovery and the extent of the 
government’s involvement.  
 
 
Keeping an eye on the long term 
 
Many people interviewed as part of this research observed that any preparedness needs to allow 
for flexibility and that planning cannot be too prescriptive. In the response itself things are 
constantly changing and developing. A one-size-fits-all approach will not work and there needs to 
be adaptability. One aspect of this is that decision-makers responding to the disaster need to keep 
one eye on the next stage, and the stage after that.  
 
This also interfaces with the importance of relationships. Naturally, new working relationships are 
forged as part of the response. In Canterbury the establishment of the Recovery Policy Team at 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, as discussed above, provided for some connectedness 
across the sector. However, once CERA was established, people who had been seconded to the 
Recovery Team from across the sector returned to their own jobs in their originating agencies. 
CERA took on the role of policy advice and strategy in relation to the Recovery. Agencies who, 
individually, had already begun carrying out their activities in Canterbury now had to connect with 
a new agency and forge relationships with the appropriate people within. CERA itself was starting 
from scratch and it too had to focus on connecting with other key agencies.  
 
The transition between the policy function at the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and 
CERA may well have gone smoothly, but one can imagine the benefits that would have been 
achieved if provision of whole-of-government policy advice had been part of the natural disaster 
planning framework. Whether the plan were to provide for the advice to sit within a particular 
department or whether it would state that a new agency would always be formed, if this had been 
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part of the planning framework, the Policy Team could already be established, with no need for 
advisors to quickly form an understanding of the features of Recovery policy, and the transition 
phase from one agency to another would have been avoided. 
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CONCLUSION: TAKE ACTION NOW FOR NEXT TIME 
 
What have we learnt from Canterbury? 
 
The above examples of interagency connectedness demonstrate the good outcomes that can arise 
from agencies working together in response to a disaster. Each of these happened under the 
systems and arrangements that existed prior to the Canterbury events, and in some cases in the 
absence of any relevant systems or arrangements at all. In that case, you might ask whether any 
work needs to be done by the government on reviewing the experience, and making 
improvements. However, as is stated in the Guidance Note on Pre-Disaster Recovery Planning issued by 
the International Recovery Platform in 2012, lessons from actual disasters form part of the cyclical 
nature of pre-disaster recovery planning. Pre-disaster planning “serves as a conduit to incorporate 
post disaster lessons learned into planning for future hazard events”56. In this case the experience 
from Canterbury should be used to strengthen New Zealand’s pre-disaster planning. 
 
Taken together our cases highlight the components that make connectedness a success. These can 
be depicted in diagram 2 (below). 
 
Diagram 2: The constituents of connectedness 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
56 International Recovery Platform, (2012), Guidance Note on Recovery: Pre-Disaster Recovery Planning, International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction, p2 
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Greater preparedness for connectedness could have made the engagements in Canterbury 
significantly easier, and certainly more efficient. The importance of the efficiency and effectiveness 
in this context is enormous. The impact of natural disaster on individuals and communities, both 
in the short and long term, correlates directly to how smoothly the actions of government run. 
Agencies need to take time now to identify aspects of their work that would have benefited from 
greater connectedness as part of their broader reviews. 
 
A whole-of-government review 
 
In order to do better next time, the government must make an active decision to ensure the review 
of the Canterbury experience is carried out on an all-of-government level. If no active decision is 
made in this space it is highly likely that individual agencies will independently carry out their own 
analysis of their individual experiences, and make changes to their frameworks and systems in 
accordance with their findings. In instances where they consider legislative change to be required, 
agencies may well consult with each other, but for matters that fall short of needing legislative 
change there is considerable risk that decisions will be taken in isolation.  
 
In fact, the assumption that agencies will carry out their own reviews is not necessarily a safe one. 
As stated in the introduction to paper, the window of opportunity for comprehensive review is 
extremely narrow. For starters, in terms of people alone, the institutional knowledge of what 
occurred and the specific details of an agency’s experience has an incredibly short lifespan. Many 
individuals who played fundamental roles in the activities of key agencies will already have moved 
on. In addition, it is well documented that government agencies, with a range of competing 
priorities to manage, face on-going pressure to do more for less in tight economic constraints. 
Despite the best of intentions, even properly resourcing a team within an agency to carry out 
analysis could be a stretch for some. Just as in the response to the events in Canterbury the 
government gave agencies the mandate to prioritise response activities, the government needs to 
provide agencies with the same permission to consider their experience as part of the broader 
whole-of-government review that is called for.  
 
An important step in initiating this process is for a part of the government to take the lead. While 
all key agencies need to demonstrate leadership in prioritising lessons learned from Canterbury, to 
properly achieve a cohesive review, an agency, whether existing or new, must be identified as the 
lead agency to facilitate this review and must be armed with the mandate to ensure the work 
commences swiftly and comprehensively. As part of this whole-of-government review, care must 
be taken to work with all relevant agencies, including departments and Crown Entities, as well as 
incorporating perspectives from the private sector, from communities, iwi, NGOs, and local 
government.  
 
The high-level policy question 
 
On completion of the review, or in a parallel process, the government’s first step will need to be 
to consider the high-level policy questions around its role in responding to disaster, and particularly 
recovery aspects. Ultimately, any planning and decisions around agencies’ roles will hinge on 
fundamental questions as to whether and in what circumstances the government of the day 
considers it has a role in responding to disasters. This has to be considered for the range of 
disasters that can strike, as there may be few similarities between responding to earthquakes and 
volcanic eruption for example. 
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The response might differ depending on the location of the disaster, the size of the population 
affected, the economic impact on the country, or many other features. It is useful to have set out 
this policy basis in advance, in a manner that provides the boundaries while maintaining sufficient 
flexibility to respond to unforeseen scenarios. Understanding the drivers for government 
involvement is the primary step before specific planning can be commenced and frameworks put 
together. 
 
In that sense, this is not a one-off decision; to be effective, it will require regular reassessment. 
Even if a future government has no appetite to make changes, there must still be a review and an 
active decision to determine that the status quo will remain. Any adjustment to the preferred policy 
stance will in turn require amendment to policies and processes that sit beneath it.  
 
The principles to be applied in planning 
 
The lessons identified in this report, among many others that will be discovered in the whole-of-
government review, can be extrapolated into principles to guide the planning for next time. 
Specifically in relation to connectedness the following principles are recommended:  
 
1. Networks and relationships: As evidenced above, connectedness and good outcomes 
are much easier achieved when there are existing networks and relationships to be drawn 
upon. A principle of recovery planning should be to ensure that the agencies, and 
individuals within agencies, focus on continuing and strengthening relationships. This 
applies both in relation to those that were available and utilised in Canterbury, and those 
that could be sensibly developed to contribute next time.  
 
2. Existing capability and capacity: The principle here is that planning should be carried 
out with a broad perspective on what capacity and capability already exists across agencies. 
Opportunities for agencies to collaborate may have been underutilised in the Canterbury 
response due to a lack of understanding between agencies of the work that different 
agencies do. The disaster response period is not the appropriate time to be discovering the 
role of other agencies, and identifying and balancing opportunities during that period is 
unrealistic. 
 
In addition, there was a large reliance on the private sector to provide services where some 
may realistically have been able to be run out of other agencies. For example, corporate 
services from sizeable agencies could be utilised by agencies that are created or grown in 
the disaster response. 
 
Also in relation to capacity and capability, the examples above have shown that  significant 
work has been carried out by the government which may not have ended up a government 
activity had it not been for existing capability in particular agencies. Of note is the 
engineering resource in the Department of Building and Housing and the establishment 
of the Engineering Advisory Group. This has been acknowledged and cemented through 
Royal Commission recommendations, but the government’s planning for next time should 
also consider other skill sets that might usefully be brought or kept in-house. This is 
particularly the case given the skill sets that would previously have been held in the Ministry 
of Works, which are now largely outside of the public sector. 
 
3. The value of information: It is recommended that agencies develop processes and 
strategies to enable the prompt sharing of information, and that frameworks are developed 
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so that the information can be compiled to create information that will be useful in a 
response and recovery setting. The value of understanding the bigger picture, and in being 
able to overlay information sets as part of this, is one aspect that was in part missing from 
the Canterbury response, which is particularly evident in the challenges for insurers to 
identify vulnerable customers.  
 
Many agencies need the same types of information, albeit for different purposes, and 
thought should be given to whether there can be one agency responsible for collecting 
information from persons affected by the disaster. For example, in assessing damage EQC 
could be given responsibility to collect other information from residents to pass on to 
other agencies around their health needs and so on. While this may have occurred as an ad 
hoc action in response to the 22 February 2011, had this been prepared in advance it would 
have ensured the right information was sought and subsequently received by the agencies 
who could make best use of it.     
 
Final reflections 
 
The response to the Canterbury earthquakes has been an eye-opener for many agencies across 
government. There have been unanticipated complexities, swaths of new and demanding roles, 
and high levels of public scrutiny; each unprecedented. Many of the government’s tasks in relation 
to the residential rebuild have involved more than one agency with more than one policy objective 
in mind. These agencies have been brought together through a mix of necessity and of existing 
relationships and networks. It should not be taken for granted that what has been achieved through 
those prized relationships and through chance encounters in Canterbury will happen as a matter 
of course next time around. The task is now for all of those government agencies who came 
together in their response to come together in learning and planning for next time. 
 
Connectedness needs to be achieved in the coming months to ensure that those with the 
knowledge and understanding of the experience in Canterbury have all the key observations at the 
forefront of their minds. Some of the lessons to be applied are drawn out in this research, but 
there are many more to be extracted from agencies who had a role to play and from individuals 
within those agencies who championed the issues and led their agency’s involvement. The 
government needs to make a deliberate decision to take a strategic approach across agencies in 
building a better framework for next time, and in doing so needs to appreciate the contribution 
that connectedness makes. 
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